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Abstract
This paper provides evidence of strategic complementarities in lenders’ contract
terms in SME financing. To isolate this strategic effect from lenders’ joint reaction to
unobserved common shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders
into an information sharing platform. Upon joining, lenders adjust their terms toward
what others are offering. This effect is mediated by market power and seems to be
driven by incentives to match rivals in order to preserve market share as opposed
to learning about fundamentals. We also find evidence that this strategic behavior
increased delinquencies during the recent crisis.
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Introduction
Information plays a fundamental role in markets and strategic behavior. Indeed, in many
settings information is dispersed: market participants do not have full information about
their counterparties or their competitors’ actions. Strategic and information considerations
are linked: agents’ optimal actions depend on their information about competitors’ actions.
In the context of credit markets, although there is a consensus that loan terms are affected
by perceived fundamentals and risk, there is a pervasive view that strategic forces among
lenders also play a role.1 Indeed, if competitors aggressively offer better terms, a lender has
incentives to match them in order to preserve its market share. These incentives potentially
played a role in the recent crisis: aggressive competition from banks and non-banks led to
lax lending standards that partially ignored fundamentals. Even ten years after the crisis,
this strategic channel seems important: aggressive competition by other lenders is the main
reason cited for relaxing business lending standards, far above improvements in economic
outlook or risk tolerance.2
This suggests that lenders are not "price takers" and that oligopolistic competition for bor-
rowers leads to strategically adjusting loan terms. Interestingly, the industrial organization
literature suggests two possibilities: lenders can mimic their rivals if there are strategic com-
plementarities, or on the contrary they can differentiate themselves through product choice.3
The sign and magnitude of these strategic responses are in fact important for predicting,
for instance, the industry effects of lifting barriers to entry or a change in the information
available about peer lenders. However, empirically estimating this strategic effect is chal-
lenging: lenders might simultaneously offer better terms not because they respond to each
other, but simply because they respond to the same shock, for example, an improvement in
the economic outlook (Manski, 1993).
This paper addresses this challenge by exploiting a shift in information that lenders have
about rivals. Specifically, we use micro lending data around the introduction of an infor-
mation sharing platform in credit markets for small and medium enterprises (SME) in the
United States. The platform provides information on contract terms offered by other lenders
that was previously impossible to observe at a large scale. We exploit the staggered timing
of lenders joining the platform to estimate the response to competitors and find that lenders
adjust their terms toward what others are offering. Consistent with a strategic channel,
this effect is mediated by market concentration and only present in the most competitive
1See for example Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) for evidence in the subprime mortgage market.
22017 New Business Lending Survey, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
3Two rivals’ actions ai and aj are strategic complements if the optimal choice of ai is increasing in aj ,
and vice versa. For endogenous product differentiation, see Shaked and Sutton (1982).
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markets.4 On the other hand, we provide additional evidence that this result cannot be
explained away by lenders’ learning about fundamentals from the platform or by lenders’
joining at the same time as shocks unrelated to the platform. Finally, we look at one impor-
tant implication of this strategic behavior: lenders who matched their competitors suffered
an increase in delinquencies during the recent crisis, possibly because these lenders neglected
future risk as they aggressively competed to preserve their current market share.
We document this effect in the context of maturity dynamics for SMEs’ equipment fi-
nancing contracts from 2001 to 2014. This setting is relevant for multiple reasons. Because
of their implications for firms’ liquidity positions and investment behavior, maturity cycles
became a concern during the recent crisis and recovery: maturity on loans lasting over a year
fell by 30% between 2007 and 2010 before slowly recovering.5 Moreover, with over $1 trillion
of annual volume, equipment financing is a major component of corporate investment, and
lending to SMEs is particularly important for policy makers.6 In our context of financing a
specific piece of equipment, it is natural to focus on maturity as it is negotiable, while con-
tract size is largely dictated by the equipment needed, and by design, interest rates are not
shared in the platform.7 Moreover, because these contracts involve fixed monthly payments,
maturity has a drastic effect on firms’ debt burden: for the median contract in our sample,
reducing maturity by a year implies up to 25% larger monthly payments. Finally, there is
evidence consistent with oligopolistic competition in this market (Murfin and Pratt (2017b),
Mian and Smith Jr (1992), or Bodnaruk et al. (2016)).
Our empirical strategy is designed to address key empirical challenges associated with
estimating strategic responses driving loan terms. Specifically, two lenders can offer similar
contracts not because they react to what the other is offering, but simply because they react
to the same shock to fundamentals. This is a crucial issue because it is plausible that at
least some of these fundamentals cannot be observed by the econometrician and therefore
cannot be controlled for. To address this challenge, we rely on two features of our setting.
First, we exploit lenders’ joining the platform in a staggered fashion to generate variation
in information sets within and across lenders over time. Second, for each borrower-lender
4This a key empirical prediction of Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011).
5Source: Survey of Terms of Business Lending. In our sample, the peak-to-trough variation is closer to
15%.
6Chairman Bernanke argued in a 2010 speech that "making credit accessible to sound small businesses
is crucial to our economic recovery and so should be front and center among our current policy challenges."
Moreover, information sharing can be particularly valuable when lending to these firms: their repayment
behavior is erratic and their size and opacity make tailoring contracts costly.
7Like many other credit bureaus (i.e. consumer bureaus in the United States), to avoid antitrust concerns
and reduce proprietary costs of sharing interest rates are not shared. Schalheim and Zhang (2017) estimate
the mean interest rate for leases to be 15% in this market.
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relationship, we observe contracts made before and after the lender joins the platform.8 Our
empirical test does not take an a priori stand on the direction of the response. The key idea
is that, while a lender’s terms may track the bureau average before, they should track it
relatively better after joining if strategic complementarities dominate, while the opposite is
true if the differentiation effect dominates. We make the argument formal by embedding our
regression model into a canonical model with strategic interaction and dispersed information.
However, this strategy creates the possibility of two important confounders. First, lenders
can respond to information in the platform other than rivals’ terms – specifically borrower
credit records. There is evidence that this reduction in asymmetric information leads lenders
to start lending to new borrowers with different characteristics (Liberti et al. (2016), Liberti
et al. (2017), Foley et al. (2018)). To abstract from any change in borrower composition, all
of our tests are conducted within an existing relationship. We therefore study how maturity
changes relative to what others are offering over a short window around the lender’s joining
the platform for the same borrower-lender pair. Second, the decision to join the platform
is voluntary and can therefore depend on a number of factors that could potentially affect
maturity independently of the information revealed by the platform. We leverage our micro-
data to show that borrower or lender shocks coinciding with the timing of joining cannot
explain away our results. Specifically, we conduct a series of additional within lender-time
and within borrower-time tests (Khwaja and Mian, 2008) that are described in the robustness
section below.
In our main specification, we show that the gap between the maturity offered by a lender
and what others in the platform are offering shrinks by 7% after the lender joins the platform.
Lenders’ terms therefore track the bureau average relatively better after joining, consistent
with a strategic response to partially match rivals. In economic terms, this corresponds to
a 2% change in monthly payments, or a change in debt burden that is comparable to a 2
percentage point change in APR. We measure average maturity within quarter-collateral type
for members, and control for year, loan size, credit history, and contract type. Consistent
with strategic complementarities, the effect is symmetric: sometimes lenders match rivals by
increasing maturity, sometimes by shortening it.
There is additional evidence that this finding is driven by a strategic response. In the
cross-section of local markets, the incentives to match others should be mediated by lenders’
market power over borrowers (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011). Lenders with market power
have less incentive to match rivals, as their market share is less sensitive to competing
8The PayNet platform launched in 2001; since then they have attracted 8 of the 10 largest lenders in
the market. Joining involves an invasive implementation process in which PayNet establishes access to the
lenders’ IT systems to ensure complete and truthful sharing. PayNet uses shared information to create credit
scores and reports for members. Nonmember cannot access the system or its reports and scores.
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offers. Indeed, we find that loan terms adjust toward rivals’ only in the least-concentrated
market segments, where markets are defined as a collateral type x census region pair, and
concentration is measured using the HHI index. We confirm this finding using relationship
switching rates as an alternative proxy for the degree of market power.
Moreover, additional results suggest that more conventional effects of information shar-
ing in credit markets cannot fully account for our findings. For instance, information can
trigger "run-like" behavior by creditors and financial distress for firms with multiple lenders
(Hertzberg et al., 2011). However, we do not find that lenders shorten their maturity sys-
tematically upon joining or that the effect is smaller for borrowers of high credit quality or
with a single relationship (for which the incentives to run are muted).9 Another possible
explanation is information aggregation: lenders react to others’ terms because they reveal
some of their private information about credit risk or borrower demand in the economy
(Hellwig, 1980). However, specialist lenders with expertise in a specific market segment do
not appear to react less than nonspecialist lenders, according to various measures of special-
ization. Overall, these findings strongly support the view that strategic complementarities
are an important driver of loan terms in this market. Any alternative mechanism would
have to explain why the effect: (i) exists within an existing relationship, (ii) is symmetric,
(iii) varies by market concentration, and (iv) does not vary by borrower creditworthiness or
lender expertise.
Finally, we discuss some implications of this strategic behavior. In particular, with the
improvement in IT and data processing techniques, the link between information and com-
petition is at the center of policy makers’ attention. In the words of European Commissioner
for Competition Margrethe Vestager, "the future of big data is not just about technology.
It’s about things like. . . competition".10 At a general level, the implications for consumer
welfare or production efficiency are not obvious (Vives, 2006): while mimicking the best
lenders can increase "production efficiency," cut-throat competition can potentially lead to
ignoring fundamentals. In order to relate these questions to our setting, we study delinquen-
cies during the recent crisis. We find suggestive evidence that matching competitors comes
with an increase in delinquencies. One interpretation is that competition can lead lenders
to neglect future risk as they compete aggressively to preserve their market share today.
We then address several important remaining threats to identification. Specifically, as
pointed out above, there could be shocks either to the lender or borrower that exactly coincide
with the time of joining the platform and drive maturity independently of observing rivals’
9Although all contracts are formally collateralized, there is still significant default risk. For instance, our
sample contains contracts to finance copiers and computers, whose value depreciates quickly, as well as other
equipment that is movable and therefore difficult to recover in default.
10EDPS-BEUC Conference on Big Data and Competition, Brussels, September 29, 2016.
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offers. We therefore conduct two additional tests. First, on the borrower side, our results hold
when comparing contracts made to the same firm by two lenders with different information
sets: one joining the platform, the other not. Specifically, we include borrower-time fixed
effects (Khwaja and Mian, 2008) and find the lenders joining PayNet offers a maturity closer
to the bureau average relative to the other lender in the same period.
Second, on the lender side, joining the platform might coincide with a shift in business
model correlated with its propensity to offer specific contract terms. However, our result
holds within lender-year across different market segments. Specifically, the information cov-
erage in the platform depends on contracts made by other lenders and thus varies by collateral
type over time in a way that is not directly driven by the decision to join.11 Including lender
x year fixed effects, we show that the maturity of collateral types with higher coverage tracks
the bureau average better than collateral types with low coverage. These additional stringent
tests support the interpretation that lenders adjust their contract terms in reaction to the
information revealed in the platform.
Related Works
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it relates to empirical studies of
complementarities in credit markets. Hertzberg et al. (2011) provides clean evidence of the
role that public information plays in credit market coordination. They find that lenders react
strongly to the public revelation of information they already possess about a borrower. This
publicity effect triggers "run-like" behavior by creditors and financial distress for firms with
multiple lenders. By comparison, we study the effect of observing information about other
lenders and find evidence of a strategic channel independent of creditor runs. Bebchuk and
Goldstein (2011) analyze a model in which lenders decisions are strategic substitutes and can
lead to a self-fulfilling market freeze. Chen et al. (2010) provide evidence from mutual fund
outflows that strategic complementarities among investors can generate financial fragility.
Murfin and Pratt (2017a) study comparable pricing in the syndicated loan market. They
find that past transactions impact new transaction pricing, but a failure to account for the
overlap in information across loans leads to pricing mistakes. While our data lacks the power
to trace out paths of influence like they do, we nevertheless find suggestive evidence of com-
plementarities leading to more frequent delinquencies during the recent crisis. Bustamante
and Frésard (2017) argue that managers are imperfectly informed about their investment
11For example, after a truck captive joins there is a large increase in the platform’s coverage of truck
contracts, but no new contracts for copiers. Thus, lenders who had joined before this truck captive experience
an information shock for reasons beyond their control (they have no say over the truck captive joining), and
only to the extent they participate in the truck market. And recall that we control for collateral market
conditions in our gap measure directly, which will absorb common demand shocks to the truck market.
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opportunities and show investment complementarity between firms due to learning from
peers.12
We also contribute to the literature that studies the drivers of loan terms, and specifically
maturity. Hertzberg et al. (2018) provide evidence from an online consumer lending platform
showing that loan maturity can be used to screen borrowers based on their private informa-
tion. Milbradt and Oehmke (2015) argue that loan maturity has real effects by distorting
firms’ decisions toward inefficiently short-term investments. In the auto loan market, Argyle
et al. (2017a) show that borrowers display a demand for maturity and target low monthly
repayments, while Argyle et al. (2018) find that loan maturity impacts the pricing of cars.
Moreover, we provide novel evidence of the effect of oligopolistic competition in credit
markets. There is evidence that imperfect competition and market power are relevant to the
financing of durable goods. Murfin and Pratt (2017b) show that market power is important
to understand the large share of captive lenders in equipment financing. A number of recent
papers study the effect of competition on consumer credit markets: Gissler et al. (2018) and
Argyle et al. (2017b) focus on auto loans, while Foley et al. (2018) and Nelson (2017) study
credit cards, and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) and Palmer (2015) the mortgage market. On the
other hand, we focus on loans to small and medium enterprises (Rice and Strahan, 2010).
Finally, this paper relates to the work on information sharing and credit bureaus, in-
cluding Liberman et al. (2018), Sutherland (2018), Liberti et al. (2017), Doblas-Madrid and
Minetti (2013), Jappelli and Pagano (2006), Giannetti et al. (2017), and Balakrishnan and
Ertan (2017), and more broadly on the role of information in lending markets (Hertzberg
et al. (2010), Liberti et al. (2016), Hauswald and Marquez (2003), Liberti (2017), Liberti
and Mian (2009), Berger et al. (2017), and Ryan and Zhu (2018)).
1 Equipment Financing and PayNet
1.1 The PayNet Platform
Our data come from PayNet, an information sharing platform focusing on the U.S. equip-
ment finance market and SMEs. Borrowers in this market seek loans and leases for an ar-
ray of assets, including agricultural, construction, manufacturing, medical, office, and retail
equipment, as well as computers, copiers, and trucks. Lenders include banks, manufactur-
ers ("captives"), and independent finance companies.13 Since PayNet’s 2001 launch, it has
12For applications of strategic complementarities in macroeconomics, see the survey of Angeletos and Lian
(2016) or Afrouzi (2017), Amador and Weill (2012), Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2015), Angeletos
and La’O (2010), Veldkamp (2011) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006).
13Murfin and Pratt (2017b) provide an explanation for the presence of captives in equipment financing.
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attracted 8 of the 10 largest lenders in the market, as well as several hundred others as
members. Like other credit bureaus, PayNet operates on the principle of reciprocity: mem-
bers must share information, and only members can purchase the credit files, credit scores,
and default probability products offered. PayNet gathers its data by directly connecting
into lenders’ IT systems, ensuring that the information shared is comprehensive and reli-
able. PayNet has developed these products using 24 million contracts for over $1.6 trillion
in transactions collected from members.
Prior to PayNet, lenders generally had access to very limited information about new
borrowers and other lenders. Competing data providers such as Experian offered limited
(and rarely timely) information about trade liabilities, which were much smaller than the
typical equipment contract. Public UCC filings documented the existence of a contract but
did not detail whether the borrower paid on time or the terms they received. Thus, PayNet
provided equipment finance lenders with a source of timely, contract-level information about
a borrower’s ability to service similar liabilities and details on previous contracts it received.
This development was particularly relevant for small borrowers, who typically lacked audited
financial statements or public information about their creditworthiness (Berger et al., 2017).
Although PayNet does not allow lenders to mine its data (e.g., by accessing all credit files for a
given industry or zip code), lenders can observe how their counterparts contract. During the
frequent process of accessing individual credit files, they can see the terms other lenders are
providing or have provided a given firm in the past. PayNet’s data collection and verification
process is further detailed in Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) and the Online Appendix
of Sutherland (2018).
Crucially for our purpose, unlike many consumer credit bureaus, the platform includes
detailed information about contracts offered by competitors. Figure 1 illustrates the detailed
information available exclusively to PayNet members. The figure displays a snapshot of a
(fictitious) borrower’s credit file accessible on the platform in return for a fee. While the first
page of the credit file contains a summary of past payments as well as the borrower’s state,
industry, and age (omitted), subsequent pages reveal the terms of past and current contracts
offered by all lenders members of PayNet. In the example of Figure 1, the borrower had two
lenders and five contracts in total. For each contract, the maturity, amount, and delinquency
status are detailed. However, similar to other credit bureaus (e.g., the consumer bureaus in
the United States), PayNet does not collect or distribute interest rate information and takes
care that it is not easily identifiable. We therefore unfortunately cannot trace directly the
pricing implications of our hypothesis.
7
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286425 
Figure 1: Past Contract Terms in PayNet Credit File
Note: This figure illustrates the type of detailed information contained in a borrower credit file in PayNet.
The terms of previous contracts signed by the borrower are highlighted.
1.2 Sample
We construct our sample from the quarterly credit files of 20,000 borrowers randomly cho-
sen from PayNet’s database. The credit files contain detailed information for each of the
borrower’s current and past contracts with PayNet members. This information includes the
contract’s amount, maturity, payment frequency, collateral type, contract type, and delin-
quency status, as well as the borrower’s state, industry, and age. The data set provides a
constant identifier for borrowers and lenders, which we use to track contracting behavior over
time. One limitation is that we cannot match lenders and borrowers to external data with
this identifier. Importantly, also note that while we have a large amount of information about
lenders’ contract choices, we cannot observe the universe of contracts in the bureau. This
implies that an estimate of the average of rivals’ contract terms, although unbiased, is mea-
sured with error. Such measurement error can in general reduce the statistical significance
of our results.
Our research question focuses on estimating the effect of observing competitors’ contract
terms on one’s own contract terms. We therefore restrict the sample of contracts used for our
main analysis to a relatively short window around the lender’s joining PayNet. We include
contracts originated between the four quarters before to four quarters after the lender joins
the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after
joining the bureau in the given collateral type. This sample selection has little effect on the
8
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distribution of loan terms in the population.
Table 1 describes the lenders and borrowers that meet our regression sample requirements
described below. We have 2,076 unique borrowers and 44 unique lenders involved in 8,194
credit relationships with 54,290 contracts. Relationships can span multiple contracts because
a borrower’s needs for capital grow over time, and old fleets depreciate and new ones with
updated features are released. Lenders on average maintain 94 relationships; this understates
their true scope given we only observe a random snapshot of their clients. Borrowers maintain
multiple relationships, in part because lenders can specialize by collateral type. A given firm
may, for example, require both computers and forklifts, and can access different lenders to
finance each. The average lender is exposed to just over six collateral types and the average
borrower to 1.7. Table A.1 illustrates the distribution of collateral types in the sample. The
five most common collateral types are copiers, trucks, construction and mining equipment,
computers, and agricultural equipment.
1.3 Oligopolistic Competition
As in other credit markets for big-ticket items (cars, real estate, etc.), borrowers in the
equipment financing market transact at regular intervals, and search for and negotiate with
lenders.14 At the same time, relationships are prevalent and lenders are plausibly able to
exercise some degree of market power. Nevertheless, market power likely varies across market
segments, consistent with existing evidence in Murfin and Pratt (2017b), Mian and Smith Jr
(1992) or Bodnaruk et al. (2016). Defining market segments as collateral type-census regions,
the median probability that a new contract is issued with a previous lender is 70%, the 25th
percentile is 55% and the 75th percentile is 92%. The median number of lenders in each
segment is 12, with an interquartile range of 5 to 31.
Lenders have incentives to respond to rivals’ offers, even if their market power means they
do not have to necessarily fully match competing offers. Intuitively, this reflects the basic
trade-off behind profit-maximization: more-generous terms increase the probability that an
offer is accepted but reduce profits conditional on acceptance. Importantly, the incentives
to match depend on the degree of market power over borrowers,15 whether it comes from
specialization or product differentiation, private information or any other reason behind
relationship stickiness. Indeed, for lenders with sizable market power, the probability of
losing a client does not change much with rivals’ offers and their strategic response is muted.
14For this reason, these markets tend not be defined by a single market-clearing price (Argyle et al., 2018).
15More precisely, in terms of the industrial organization literature, they depend on the elasticity of residual
demand.
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1.4 Contract Terms
Table 3 describes the terms for a typical contract in our sample. The median contract size is
$20,300, with an average of $101,000. The median maturity is 37 months from origination;
the average is 44.3 months. Eighty-one percent of contracts are some form of lease (including
true leases, conditional sales, and rental leases) while the remaining 19% are loans.16 The
overwhelming majority of contracts require fixed monthly payments. Seventeen percent of
contracts involve some form of guarantor. The level of these contract terms are broadly
similar before and after a lender joins the platform, although these levels are affected by
changes in lender and borrower composition over time.
In this paper, we focus on contract maturity as our key variable for three reasons. First,
maturity impacts firms’ liquidity positions and investment behavior. During the recent crisis,
maturity on loans lasting over a year fell by 30% between 2007 and 2010 before recovering
slowly (Survey of Terms of Business Lending). Figures 3 and 4 show that contracts in
our sample also display considerable time variation across the business cycle. Second, in
the context of financing a specific piece of equipment, maturity is negotiable but contract
size is largely dictated by the equipment needed. In addition, interest rates are not shared
in the platform for fear of collusion, which is similar to many other credit bureaus (i.e.
consumer loans in the United States). Finally, maturity has a drastic effect on firms’ debt
burden because virtually all contracts involve fixed monthly payments. For instance, for
the median contract in our sample, reducing maturity by a year implies up to 25% larger
monthly payments.17 This plausibly results in a demand for maturity in the same way as is
documented in other settings such auto loans (Argyle et al., 2017a) or student loans (Cox,
2017): everything else equal, the majority of borrowers is likely to prefer longer maturities.18
Maturity choices appear to be far from mechanical and display substantial unexplained
variation in the cross-section of borrowers and lenders over our sample period. The raw
standard deviation is 17 months, a little less than half of the sample mean. Table A.2 in
the Appendix shows that only about a third of this variation can be explained by collateral
type, year, and borrower-lender fixed effects. In the analysis below, we analyze the dispersion
in contract terms by computing, for each contract, the gap between its maturity and the
16The borrower’s choice between a lease or a loan can relate to many considerations, including cost, tax or
financial reporting treatment, different services offered under each contract type, the borrower’s credit risk
and liquidity, and obsolescence risk. For our purposes, these contracts function similarly. In the context of
captive financing, Murfin and Pratt (2017b) highlight the fundamental similarities of leases and loans.
17This back-of-the-envelope calculation relies on Schalheim and Zhang (2017)’s estimate of a mean interest
rate of 15% on leases. The exact number depends on contract type, residual value estimates, and any options
embedded.
18Hertzberg et al. (2018) documents that demand for maturity is heterogeneous in consumer credit markets,
and that maturity can be used screen applicants. We abstract from screening by focusing on repeat borrowers.
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bureau’s average maturity (excluding the lender’s own contracts) for that collateral type in
the previous quarter. The median gap in our sample is 11 months, which is a substantial
fraction of the underlying variation in maturity choice.19
1.5 Lender Participation to PayNet
When a lender joins the PayNet platform, it gains access to information about others’ con-
tracts, but must share information about its own contracts, including past contracts. This
is enforced through PayNet’s direct access into lenders’ IT systems and extensive audit and
testing procedures. This back-fill requirement is crucial to our empirical design: We can
observe contracts made before and after the lender joins the platform. This allows us to
study changes in contracting between the same firm and lender during a relatively short
window around the lender’s joining PayNet.
Another key feature of our setting is that lenders join in a staggered pattern over the
entire sample period. This variation in time of joining brings two benefits. First, the platform
information is not publicly revealed: in the same period, some lenders have access to it,
while others competing in the same market do not. This within market-period, across-
lender variation allows us to distinguish the effects of the new information from other events
affecting lenders or borrowers in a given year. Second, the information revealed to entrants
by the platform varies over time as a function of what other lenders are offering. Indeed,
lenders often specialize by collateral type; therefore the bureau coverage across collateral
types evolves in a nonsystematic pattern. Thus, members regularly experience shocks to
the information coverage in their markets driven by other lenders, which is by construction
outside of their control.20 We leverage these additional sources of variation in our main
specification and robustness tests.
Table 3 shows the variation in the timing of joining the platform for lenders meeting
our sample criteria described in Section 3. Lenders join in all years between 2002 and 2014
except one. While large lenders tend to join earlier than small lenders, in any given year,
a variety of lenders join. At the same time, joining PayNet is voluntary and the timing of
joining the platform is not randomly assigned. Below, we leverage the variation in our data
to ensure that results are not driven by lender or borrower shocks coinciding with the timing
of joining. Note also that Liberti et al. (2017) study in detail the decision to join PayNet
and show that a key driver of lenders’ joining is access to new markets, but our tests are
19Hertzberg et al. (2018) show that lenders can use maturity to screen new applicants. To control for this
aspect, we focus on existing relationships as opposed to new customers, as explained in detail below.
20Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix shows there is considerable time variation in the volume of contracts
in the bureau across collateral types.
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performed exclusively within an existing relationship. Note also that our sample of lenders
is by design different from Liberti et al. (2017) in that, given our purpose, we impose a
different event window and sample requirements, as described in Section 2.
2 Estimating Strategic Response to Rivals
The key empirical challenge in testing for strategic response in lending is the existence of
unobserved common shocks: lenders might start offering better terms not because they
respond to each other, but simply because they react to the same news about fundamentals,
for instance, an improvement in the economic outlook.21 To address this challenge, we
exploit a shift in information that lenders have about rivals that comes with joining the
platform. Moreover, to abstract away as much as possible from other forces, we perform our
tests within an existing borrower-lender pair. Specifically, we ask whether the maturity of
contracts issued after joining matches rivals’ maturities better relative to contracts issued
before for the same borrower. This effect would be consistent with lenders adjusting their
terms toward what others are offering.
2.1 An Illustrative Model
Strategic response: The market for financing equipment is not centralized and not all
lenders offer the same contract terms in equilibrium. Instead, buyers search for good deals
and lenders’ choice of terms is driven by attracting or retaining borrowers. We present a
simple framework to understand strategic incentives to match rivals. For a given borrower,
lenders set maturity mi to maximize expected profits, which depend on beliefs about rivals’
offers m−i and their market power MP :
E[pi] = P(offer is accepted|mi,m−i,MP )× pi(mi)
Market power comes from the lack of rivals in the area, specialization, expertise or dif-
ferentiation, as well as private information about borrowers or any other interpretation that
can rationalize switching costs. Given some nonzero demand for maturity from borrowers,
it is plausible that the probability that the offer is accepted increases in the lender’s own
term mi and decreases in rivals’ terms m−i. This would naturally lead to strategic comple-
mentarities: the optimal maturity choice m∗i increases with the lender’s belief of its rivals’
offers. On the other hand, the industrial organization literature has also raised the possibility
that rivals choose to differentiate themselves through product choice (Shaked and Sutton,
21See the "reflection problem" of Manski (1993).
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1982). Our empirical test does not take an a priori stand on the direction of the response,
and will directly estimate which explanation dominates in the data. Denote the degree of
complementarity or substitutability by α(MP ) = ∂m∗i /∂m−i and note that in both cases it
depends on market power. Intuitively, for lenders in a dominant position, the probability of
losing a client does not change much with rivals’ offers.22
Dispersed information: A key ingredient absent in the simple framework above is that
lenders likely do not have full information about their rivals’ offers nor their borrowers. We
therefore adapt a canonical version of the "beauty contest" popularized by Morris and Shin
(2002).23 We use the model to transparently describe: (1) the effect of joining the platform
and (2) how we empirically account for some important confounders.
We decompose lender i’s choice of maturity m to firm f , which is part of a group of
similar firms g, linearly as follows:
mfi = m
g
0︸︷︷︸
public information
+ E[φg|Ii]︸ ︷︷ ︸
borrower fundamentals
+ αE[mg−i|Ii]︸ ︷︷ ︸
competitors’ terms
+ ηif︸︷︷︸
idiosyncratic to relationship
When deciding what maturity to offer, lenders are influenced by their beliefs about bor-
rower fundamentals, that is, any force that influences its ability to repay. Lenders also care
about their competitors’ terms, with α denoting the degree of strategic complementarity or
substitutability as discussed above. The idiosyncratic term ηif includes borrower character-
istics, news about its creditworthiness, or shocks to the lender’s balance sheet that affect its
propensity to lend.
Crucially, lenders are uncertain about both fundamentals and their competitors’ actions.
Before joining the information sharing platform, lenders have two sources of information:
(1) public information about fundamentals or competitors’ terms that can be gleaned from,
for instance, forecasts of local and national economic conditions or industry reports and
newsletters, summarized in m0, and (2) private signals si = (sφi , smi ), reflecting the lender’s
own effort to determine the appropriate contract maturity.
After joining the platform, lenders can also observe an additional signal: the average
terms offered by competitors m¯g to similar borrowers.24 This signal is potentially informative
22A natural question is whether lenders can adjust other terms in order to compensate for the change in
maturity. The answer is yes, but note that any adjustment comes at the risk of losing the borrowers. Argyle
et al. (2018) for instance show that changes in the price of cars induced by a change in financing terms is
unlikely to leave the borrower indifferent.
23Our main text is limited to notation and key ideas, while technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
For tractability, we make some standard parametric assumptions, namely linearity and joint normality,
although the setting can naturally be extended. Note also that while the setup is similar, we study a
different question from Morris and Shin (2002), namely the effect of observing others as opposed to the
social value of public information.
24Concretely, lenders can learn about others’ terms by purchasing individual credit files from PayNet. This
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about both fundamentals and competitors’ terms. Intuitively, in equilibrium, the maturity
choice depends on the information available to the lender at the time. Before joining, lenders
weight their own private signals depending on how precise their prior and signals are about
fundamentals and their competitors’ terms. After joining, lenders place less weight on their
own private signals and place some weight on the bureau average.
Importantly, note the clear identification challenge in cross-sectional data. Maturity
choices are naturally correlated across agents due to public information m0 as well as private
signals {si}, independent of the information revealed by the bureau. This is the idea that
lenders might start offering better terms at the same time not because they respond to
each other, but simply because they react to the same news about fundamentals. The main
contribution of our empirical strategy is to specifically account for these unobserved common
components.
Effect of joining platform: We exploit the time dimension associated with the lender
joining PayNet. Joining the information sharing platform leads to a shift in the lender’s
information set. Our main specification measures how maturity changes within a relationship
over a short window around the lender joining’s PayNet. An intuitive prediction of the model
is that, while a lender’s terms may track the bureau average before joining, they track it
relatively better after joining if there are complementarities. Figure 2 provides a graphical
illustration of this idea, and a formal proof within the context of the model is provided in
the Appendix. In case of strategic substitutability, the reverse pattern should be observed.
In the data, we can follow lender-borrower relationships over time, including the time before
the lender joined the platform. Moreover, we can also observe rivals’ offers before as well
after the lender joins. This allows us to test this prediction directly within a fixed effects
regression framework.
2.2 Addressing Confounders
By construction, our empirical strategy is not confounded by the existence of a number of
factors: public information unobservable to econometrician m0, other sources of information
outside of the platform si, or idiosyncratic loan terms ηlf . Indeed, all of these forces exist in
the model, and our tests based on comparing before and after joining are valid independent
of the sequence of realization of any of these shocks.25 This is the main contribution of
our approach. However, this strategy creates the possibility of two important confounders,
collection process makes it unlikely they can learn the entire distribution of competitors’ terms or that they
can leak this information easily.
25However, a necessary assumption for identification is that their precision or dispersion is constant around
the time lenders join within fixed effects groups. This cannot be taken for granted, given that lenders’
decisions to join is not randomly assigned, a concern we address thoroughly below.
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Figure 2: Hypothesis: lender’s terms track bureau average better after joining
i.e forces besides strategic interactions that can lead lenders to adjust terms toward what
rivals are offering. Specifically, lenders’ responses might be driven by (i) information in the
platform other than rivals’ offers, namely borrower fundamentals, or (ii) by shocks unrelated
to the platform information but whose timing coincides with the decision to join. We take
both concerns seriously and design our main specification, as well as additional tests to
specifically address them as best we can.
Learning about fundamentals: There are two distinct learning channels. First,
lenders can learn about the borrower through its PayNet credit file. However, because
we restrict attention to lending to previously existing borrowers, the credit file is not neces-
sarily informative. Nevertheless, we show our main result holds for borrowers with a single
relationship, for which the credit file carries no additional information. Second, lenders can
learn from others through information aggregation: rivals’ terms to other similar borrowers
partly reflect their private signal sφ about fundamentals. We carry additional tests to see
if "specialist" lenders, with more expertise in their specific market, react less compared to
others.
Other shocks correlated with joining PayNet: The decision to join the platform
is voluntary and can therefore depend on a number of factors that could potentially affect
maturity independently of the information revealed by the bureau. On this front, note first
that Liberti et al. (2017) show that the key driver of lenders’ joining PayNet is a desire
to enter new markets. However, our main test is exclusively within existing markets. In
addition, we conduct a series of additional within borrower-time (Khwaja and Mian, 2008)
and within lender-time tests to show that borrower or lender shocks coinciding with the
timing of joining cannot explain away our results.
15
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286425 
2.3 Main Findings
We design our main specification to answer the following question: does the contract maturity
for the same borrower match the lender’s rivals’ maturities better after the lender joins the
bureau? For each contract, the dependent variable is a measure of the "gap" |m∗i−m¯| between
the maturity offered by the lender and what rivals are offering for similar transactions. The
variable of interest is a "Post joining" dummy, equal to 0 for contracts issued before joining
PayNet and 1 for those issued after. A negative coefficient δpost < 0 implies that lenders
react to the bureau information by offering terms more similar to competitors. Importantly,
we can account for heterogeneous deviations from average maturity by including a series of
granular fixed effects.
Specifically, the main specification estimates the following fixed effect regression:
log |mlfc,t −mc,t−1| = δpost + ηlf + αt + νcontract + εlfc,t (1)
The unit of observation is a contract signed between firm f and lender l to finance a specific
piece of equipment. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters
before to four quarters after the lender joins the bureau. Because our predictions concern
the intensive margin, we only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract
after joining the bureau in the given collateral type.
The dependent variable is the log of absolute value of the gap between the contract
maturity at origination and the bureau average maturity for that collateral type in the
previous quarter mc,t−1, excluding the lender’s own contracts. We show robustness to using
different measures of rivals’ offers below. Importantly, recall that our data set is constructed
from a random sample of 20,000 borrowers’ quarterly credit files. We therefore cannot
observe the universe of contracts in the bureau, and this power concern somewhat restricts
how finely we can measure rivals’ offers.
The parameter of interest is the coefficient δpost. To control for heterogeneous deviations
from average maturity, we add a series of fixed effects. ηlf consists of a set of borrower-
lender fixed effects to account for idiosyncratic time-invariant maturity at the relationship
level, including industry and regional variation. Given that lenders join at different times,
we can include a set of year fixed effects αt to absorb aggregate time variation in maturity
gaps across firms and lenders. Note also that the variation at the collateral type-quarter
level is differenced out in the left-hand side variable. Finally, we include contract character-
istic controls νcontract for each of the three contract size categories, whether the contract is
classified as lease or a loan, and each borrower risk category based on prior delinquencies.26
26Specifically, the three contract size categories are: small ticket (below $250k), medium ticket (between
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To lend support to the empirical strategy, Table A.3 in the Appendix reports pre-trends
for contract terms before joining the platform. For the entire distribution of loan size and
maturity, there is virtually no difference a quarter before joining relative to a year prior to
joining. The distribution of the gap relative to the bureau average also does not display
any particular trend. The lack of pre-trends also assuages concerns about survivorship bias.
Because our Post variable of interest captures the passage of time, it is identified only for
borrowers with a contract before and after their lender joins PayNet. While in principle the
passage of time (i.e. survival) can be correlated with borrower characteristics, we do not see
this pattern prior to joining. In fact, the dynamic coefficient plots in Figure 5 below show
that the change in maturity happens exactly on impact, the quarter after the lender joins
PayNet.
Table 4 presents the main result of estimating Equation 1. The first two columns show
that upon joining the bureau, the gap between a lender’s maturity and the bureau average
falls by 7% in absolute value. This effect reveals that observing new information about
competitors leads lenders to offer maturities closer to what others are offering. Interestingly,
the effect appears to be symmetric: lenders adjust terms in both directions. Indeed, the
last column of Table 4 shows that maturity itself does not change on average, only the gap
relative to rivals changes. This symmetry is consistent with strategic complementarities:
when a lender learns that its terms are less generous than rivals, offering better terms can
improve its market share. Conversely, if terms are too generous, offering worse terms will
not dramatically reduce its market share.
Economically, this information effect implies a notable change in borrowers’ debt bur-
dens. To get a sense of economic magnitudes, we translate our main estimate into a change
in implied monthly payments.27 While we cannot directly observe interest rates nor any em-
bedded options in our data, we can use Schalheim and Zhang (2017)’s estimate of the mean
annualized interest rate of 15%. Given that our main estimate corresponds to a one-month
change in contract maturity, this implies a 2% change in monthly payments, equivalent to
a 2 percentage point change in APR.28 Admittedly, this back-of-the-envelope calculation is
an upper bound on the effect given that we cannot observe any potential impact on the rate
or the price of equipment. Nevertheless, it is important to note that lenders have limited
ability to undo the maturity effect by, say, increasing rates, as this would potentially turn
$250k and $5M) and big ticket (above $5M). The three delinquencies categories are: no missed payments,
missed payments under 90 days late, and default or missed payments over 90 days late, all measured over
the last three years.
27Recall that virtually all contracts in this market have fixed monthly payments.
28For example, the median contract is for $20,000 and 37 months, which corresponds to a $678 payment
per month. Reducing maturity to 36 months increases monthly payments to $693, roughly comparable to
increasing the interest rate from 15% to 17% ($698).
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borrowers away.29
Table 5 shows that this result is robust to a number of alternative specifications, both
in terms of economic magnitude and statistical significance. To account for heterogeneous
shocks to collateral types across regions, column 1 calculates the bureau average by collateral
type-region-quarter categories instead of collateral type-quarter and yields a similar estimate.
Column 2 shows that our results are unchanged if we drop contracts originated during the
crisis years of 2008-2010. Column 3 shows that our results are not driven by small collateral
types with fewer than one hundred observations, for which the bureau average is likely
measured with a significant amount of error. Columns 4 performs a placebo test in which we
replace the bureau average for the collateral type in our dependent variable with the bureau
average for all other collateral types. As expected, our results attenuate. We perform two
additional placebo tests. First, in column 5 we calculate the bureau average using contracts
from one year ago instead of current contracts. Second, in column 6 we calculate the bureau
average using an unrelated collateral type, based on the relatedness measure introduced in
Liberti et al. (2017). For both placebo tests, we find null results. Moreover, unreported
results show that the effect is not tied to whether the lender joins early or late.
2.4 The Role of Market Power
One way to add support to the hypothesis that lenders’ reaction is driven by strategic
complementarities is to test the prediction that the effect should be mediated by market
power. Indeed, lenders in a dominant position and whose market share is less sensitive to
competitors’ actions have less incentive to match rivals.
To test this hypothesis, we construct two proxies of market power.30 We first calculate
the degree of market concentration based on the local HHI. Table A.5 in the Appendix shows
summary statistics for these measures. We define a "market" either at the collateral type-
contract size level or at the collateral type-contract size-census region level. To alleviate
any concern that local market concentration is directly affected by information sharing, we
compute market concentration at the beginning of 2001, before PayNet was introduced.
There is a considerable variation in concentration across market segments: across contracts,
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the distribution implies a .15-.20 increase
in the HHI indices. We also use relationship switching rates as an alternative measure of
market competitiveness. Some market segments see more relationship switching than others,
presumably because of their unique degree of product differentiation, specialization, or other
29By definition, adjusting other loan terms to make borrowers indifferent would not help market shares.
30We rely on proxies because direct measures of market power are hard to obtain outside a fully structural
model.
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switching costs.
Table 6 shows that the main result is entirely driven by market segments with low con-
centration levels. The first two columns split the sample according the median HHI at the
collateral type-contract size-census region level. In markets with low concentration levels,
the gap between the lender’s maturity and the bureau average falls by about 10% after
joining, while it is unchanged in markets with high concentration levels. Columns 4 and 5
repeat this split with the more aggregated definition of HHI, while columns 3 and 6 use an
interactive specification instead of a sample split. The last three columns show the same
result for the alternative measure of market power using relationship switching rates. Table
A.4 in the Appendix replicates these findings for several further alternative definitions of
market concentration and switching rates.
Figure 5 shows the full dynamics of the effect across subsamples with high and low market
concentrations respectively. Each panel plots the coefficients of a version of Equation 1
in which each quarter before and after joining has its own dummy variable. The omitted
category is the quarter prior to joining and is labeled as time zero. The left panel shows that,
in the most-concentrated markets, the gap between a lender’s terms and the bureau average
is unaffected by joining. The right panel paints a different picture for the most-competitive
markets. After joining, there is a significant and persistent fall in the gap, implying that
lenders adjust their terms toward what others are offering. The gradual reduction in the gap
is intuitive: because lenders cannot mine the database, it takes time to aggregate and use
the information about rivals contained in individual credit files.
These results are consistent with a strategic channel of information sharing, with the
effects depending on the degree of market power over borrowers. Lenders in a dominant
position and whose market share is less sensitive to competitors face little competitive pres-
sure to respond to what others are offering.3132 Note also that, reassuringly, there are no
significant pre-trends and the effect arises upon joining.
31One concern is that this concentration effect works through learning about borrowers’ fundamentals
instead. However, Bustamante and Frésard (2017) show in detail that this channel would lead to the
opposite pattern: the effect should be stronger in more concentrated markets in which a fringe of smaller
firms has stronger incentives to learn from larger product-market peers. Section 3 offers a more natural
cross-sectional test of the learning channel by sorting lenders according to their expertise.
32Ideally, we would also use data on applications to measure directly how the take-up rate of a lender’s
offer depends on rivals’ maturity, as in Argyle et al. (2018). Unfortunately, PayNet does not collect data on
applications.
19
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286425 
3 Robustness and Other Mechanisms
3.1 Other Mechanisms
The previous section provides robust evidence of a strategic effect of information sharing:
lenders’ match competitors to an extent that depends on their market power over borrow-
ers. In this section, we put this result into perspective with more conventional channels
of information sharing in credit markets. We do not claim that these channels are not at
play in general; in fact, previous work using PayNet data suggests they are in our setting
(Sutherland (2018), Liberti et al. (2017)). We argue only that our specific findings cannot
be fully explained by a number of forces previously documented.
Revelation of Credit History: A key role of credit bureaus is to create credit files
that reduce information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. The revelation of
borrowers’ payment histories affects the composition of credit and contract terms. Part of
this channel works through a change in the composition of borrowers: worse borrowers are
screened out or offered harsher terms, while better borrowers receive better offers (Foley
et al., 2018). However, by design, our tests keep the composition of borrower-lender pairs
constant by including relationship fixed effects. The effect we document is therefore a change
in maturity within a relationship. The revelation of credit histories can affect an existing
relationship if a borrower has multiple lenders. Accessing the bureau can reveal negative
information to the lender that the borrower tried to keep secret previously. If this channel
were driving our result, we expect that it would be smaller or absent for borrowers with (1)
a good credit history, and (2) a single relationship because for them the credit file would
contain no new information.33 However, Table 8 reveals that none of these predictions hold
in this sample.
Creditor Runs: Alternatively, lenders can react to observing others’ terms due to the
fear of a creditor run.34 For instance, Hertzberg et al. (2011) illustrates the effect of infor-
mation sharing on lender coordination. In the context of maturity choice, Brunnermeier and
Oehmke (2013) emphasize the risk of a "maturity rat race," in which new lenders offer short
maturities in an effort to front-run existing creditors. In general, these incentives to run lead
to strategic complementarities in maturity choice that could explain a convergence in ma-
turities after joining the bureau. Although all loans are formally collateralized, there is still
significant default risk. Nevertheless, three pieces of evidence speak against an explanation
33It may be news that the borrower does not have a relationship with any other lender. Nevertheless, we
would expect this piece of news to be substantially less informative than a full credit history.
34More broadly, a number of papers have emphasized the role of information in explaining run-like behavior,
such as Morris and Shin (1998), Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011), Goldstein et al. (2011), Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005).
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based on run-like behavior of creditors. First, it does not appear that lenders shorten their
maturities systematically upon joining: lenders adjust their terms toward what others are
offering, in both directions. Moreover, the aforementioned findings in Table 8 are at odds
with a run interpretation; the effect is equally strong for borrowers with good credit records
or with a single relationship for which the incentives to run are muted.35
Information Aggregation and Lender Specialization: Finally, we examine a last
alternative channel based on information aggregation. In this view, lenders react to others’
terms because they reveal some of their private information about credit risk or borrower de-
mand in the economy. Note the differences with the previous channels. The strategic channel
emphasizes that lenders care about others’ actions per se, while the information aggregation
channel argues that they care because of what they represent: maturities partially reveal
competitors’ private information that was used to make this choice. As opposed to learning
about a specific borrower from its payment history, information aggregation postulates that
lenders look at the bureau information to extrapolate to other similar borrowers (e.g., with
respect to size, sector, or collateral type).36 This insight is canon in the context of finan-
cial markets (Hellwig, 1980) and the information aggregation channel is often mentioned in
antitrust debates related to the benefits of information sharing, a point we will revisit.
In the context of credit markets, this is an intriguing hypothesis. Admittedly, it is difficult
to fully separate from the strategic channel, as the perfect test would rely on observing beliefs
or preferences. Instead, we proxy for differences in information about fundamentals across
lenders. The hypothesis is that if some lenders are more informed than others, they should
react less to the information in the bureau. Indeed, a lender with more-precise prior or more
private signals puts less weight on others’ terms when deciding what contract to offer.37
Toward this end, we compare the behavior of specialist lenders relative to others upon
joining the platform. We include numerous definitions of lender specialization with the intent
of capturing lenders that have strong expertise in a specific market segment. Table 9 presents
the results. Columns (1) and (2) define specialization as the number of quarters since the
lender’s first contract originated in this collateral type or collateral type-region category.
Columns (3) and (4) define a lender as a specialist for a specific collateral type if that
collateral type is either the most common or one of the top three originated by that lender.
35In general, an additional test of a maturity rat race could exploit variation in time to maturity of
competitors’ contracts: the effect should be more pronounced for borrowers that have another contract
expiring sooner. However, in our setting, virtually all contracts have fixed equal monthly payments, making
front-running other creditors difficult.
36Note however that it is not easy to learn about collateral values as recovery values are not reported in
the platform.
37In the context of real estate markets, Stroebel (2016) and Kurlat and Stroebel (2015) also exploit
heterogeneity in expertise.
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Column (5) defines a lender as a specialist for a specific collateral type if that collateral type
makes up at least 30% of its lending portfolio. The information aggregation channel would
imply that specialists adjust their terms relatively less upon observing others’ terms, leading
to a positive interaction term Post × Specialist. However, the interaction between joining
and the specialist dummy is not positive in any specification. The interaction is typically
small, negative, and insignificant. Given that lenders with strong expertise in a specific
market segment do not appear to react less than nonspecialists, these results suggest that
information aggregation plays no detectable role in our results.
Attention Allocation: Liberti et al. (2017) show that the main reason lenders seem
to join PayNet is to enter new markets. In principle it could be that lenders are switching
their attention to new markets at the expense of markets they were previously active in.
For the old markets, they then take a more mechanical approach of simply conforming with
other lenders. Directly testing this hypothesis is particularly difficult: we lack the data
to measure the workload of loan officers or the information collected prior to the lender’s
maturity choice, assuming that would be enough. However, it is not immediately clear why
this shift in attention should be correlated with market concentration and uncorrelated with
lender’s expertise.
Together, these findings strongly support the view that strategic complementarities are
an important driver of loan terms in this market. Any alternative mechanism would have
to be consistent with at least four findings. First, the effect of matching rivals exists within
an existing relationship. Second, it is symmetric around zero (maturity itself is unchanged).
Third, it varies by market concentration. Fourth, it does not vary by borrower creditworthi-
ness or lender expertise.
3.2 Other Shocks Coinciding with Lender’s Joining PayNet
Joining PayNet is voluntary and not randomly assigned. Therefore we cannot exclude the
possibility that our results are due to factors other than the bureau information that drives
both the decision to join and maturity choices. Related, note that access to new markets is
the key driver of lenders’ joining the PayNet platform (Liberti et al., 2017). However, our
main test is exclusively within existing markets: it includes lender-borrower fixed effects and
is restricted to lenders with contracts in a given collateral type before and after joining. Note
also that Table A.3 and Figure 5 reveal no discernible pre-trends in our dependent variable
prior to joining. Nevertheless, we leverage the granularity of our data and conduct a number
of robustness tests to directly address this threat to identification.
Accounting for Borrower Shocks: On the borrower side, our results hold when
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comparing contracts made to the same firm at the same time by lenders with different
information sets. We exploit the fact that not all lenders join at the same time. As opposed
to many other settings, this variation in joining times implies that the platform information
is not publicly revealed. In the same period, some lenders have access to it while others do
not. We can use this within-period, across-lender variation to distinguish the effects of the
new information from other events affecting a given borrower in a given year. Specifically,
we include borrower-year fixed effects for the subset of borrowers with multiple lenders:
log |mlfc,t −mc,t−1| = δpost + ηlf + ζft + νcontract + εlfc,t (2)
Panel A of Table 7 shows the results of this extended specification. As before, the gap
between a lender’s maturity and the bureau average falls after joining in competitive market
segments, but is unchanged in others. The estimated magnitudes are naturally lower, as the
average effect on the borrower is absorbed in the borrower-time fixed effects. The coefficient
reflects the reduction in the gap after joining relative to other lenders of the firm in the post
period. This more stringent specification alleviates the concern that results are driven by
shocks to borrower demand or creditworthiness that coincide with the lender’s decision to
join PayNet.
Accounting for Lender Shocks: On the lender side, joining PayNet might coincide
with a shift in its business model, which is potentially correlated with its propensity to offer
specific contract maturities. To address this concern, we design a within-lender-time test that
exploits the behavior of other lenders. Specifically, the information coverage in the bureau
depends on contracts originated by others and thus varies by collateral type over time in a
way that is not directly driven by the decision to join. For example, after a lender joins, they
have no control over how the bureau’s membership or coverage evolves. Any given year could
see non-systematic changes in bureau coverage across collateral types based on who else joins,
and these coverage changes affect the precision of the bureau average. This variation driven
by others sharing (which by construction is beyond the previously joining lender’s control)
allows us to check whether our result holds within lender-year across different collateral
types.
We can therefore verify whether the maturity of collateral types with higher coverage
tracks the bureau average better than collateral types with low coverage. Concretely, we
augment Equation 1 by adding two elements:
log |mlfc,t −mc,t−1| = δpost ∗ V olumec,t−1 + ηlf + ξlt + νcontract + εlfc,t (3)
First, the main coefficient of interest is now the Post×Volume interaction, where Volume is
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defined as the number of contracts in the bureau of the same collateral type still open as
of the previous quarter.38 Second, we include a lender-year fixed effect ξlt that absorbs any
change in lender’s supply that is constant across collateral types within a year.
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results for this extended specification. The estimated
coefficients are consistent with our main finding. For a given lender joining in a specific
quarter, the maturity of collateral types with higher coverage tracks the bureau average
better than collateral types with low coverage and only so in the most-competitive market
segments. The magnitudes are again lower, as the average effect on the lender is absorbed
by the lender-time fixed effects. Columns 5 and 6 also include borrower-year fixed effects
for robustness and arrive at the same results. These tests lend additional support to the
interpretation that lenders adjust their maturities in reaction to the information revealed in
the bureau, as opposed to other factors that drive the decision to join the platform.
4 Implications
In the context of credit markets, the strategic channel appears to go beyond conventional
mechanisms of the effects of information sharing. This is largely because in our setting,
lenders gain access to a key source of additional information: their competitors’ contract
terms. Importantly, how much this information matters depends on market power; lenders
in dominant positions have little incentive to match their competitors’ offers. This result
speaks, in a novel way, to the interaction between information and market competition that
has been emphasized in the literature (Vives, 2006; Jappelli et al., 2000).
Interestingly, across many markets, the debate on the effect of information sharing on
market behavior has resurfaced recently due to the rise in big data and algorithm develop-
ments. European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager argued that "the future
of big data is not just about technology. It’s about things like. . . competition".39 The
economic forces at play are subtle. On the one hand, information from competitors could
facilitate collusion. On the other hand, there are potential benefits of pooling information:
it can improve production efficiency or remove barriers to competition. Similarly, having
access to more information can backfire if "mistakes" are propagated as opposed to corrected
when information is shared. For instance, Murfin and Pratt (2017a) document in detail how
the use of comparables leads to pricing mistakes in the syndicated loan market.40
In order to relate these questions to our setting, we provide a final set of tests linking
38We omit the level effect of Volume in the regression equation for brevity.
392016 EDPS-BEUC Conference on Big Data and Competition. See also Ferretti (2014) for a discussion
of the role of information sharing from the point of view of European competition law.
40See also Hassan and Mertens (2017) for the role of mistakes in a macroeconomic model.
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our main finding to delinquencies during the recent crisis. Broadly speaking, there are
two possible channels that could increase delinquencies. First, enhanced competition can
lead lenders to neglect future risk as they compete aggressively to preserve their market
share today. Second, reliance on hard information such as credit reports and scores exposes
lenders to significant losses caused by negative shocks that are not anticipated by the hard
information.41
To investigate this possibility, we exploit the staggered timing of lenders’ joining and
study how contracts originated prior to the crisis end up performing during the crisis. Specif-
ically, for each lender joining between 2005 and 2007, we study the 2008-2009 performance
of contracts originated shortly before joining, compared to contracts originated shortly af-
ter joining. Our assumption, based on our prior tests, is that lenders do more firm-specific
screening before joining, and rely more on shared information after and react to what rivals
are offering. In addition to lender fixed effects, our tests include indicators for the quarter of
origination for each collateral type and the quarter of origination for each borrower region.
These last controls ensure that our results are not driven by lending to different cohorts with
differential (and potentially region-specific) default risk.
Table 10 shows that contracts originated just after the lender joined experienced more
crisis-period delinquencies than the contracts originated by the same lender just before.
Specifically, the post-join contracts experienced approximately 0.3 more quarters of delin-
quency from 2008 to 2009 than the pre-join contracts. One interpretation is that a desire to
match competitors can backfire if lenders give less attention to fundamental sources of risk.
Admittedly, this is not the only possible explanation and although our data cannot reject
alternatives with absolute confidence, there is additional evidence that a strategic channel
plays a role. Consistent with our prior results, we also find that the effect is entirely driven
by markets with low levels of market power. It is also concentrated in states that experienced
the largest drops in housing prices. Moreover, there is a reduction in the average gap between
the lender’s contract maturity and rivals’ maturity after joining PayNet, but this decline is
more pronounced for contracts ending up delinquent relative to contracts that experienced
no delay in payments. Finally, it does not appear that lenders target riskier borrowers after
joining. On the contrary, if anything the credit record of borrowers improves, consistent with
the canonical information effect of credit bureaus.
Because the set of lenders joining PayNet a few years before the crisis instead of in other
periods is small and potentially selected, we take this evidence as suggestive as opposed to
41Rajan et al. (2015) document this phenomenon in the market for securitized subprime mortgages. More
generally, this is related to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1983). See also Farboodi et al. (2018) for a recent
discussion of how the use of information by the stock market can deviate from the social optimal.
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definitive. Nevertheless, it supports the idea that strategic incentives to match competitors
behind contract design can have a cost if they lead to the neglect of fundamental risk.
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of learning about competitors on the behavior of market
participants. We document this effect in the context of maturity dynamics for small and
medium enterprises (SME) equipment financing contracts using micro-data from the intro-
duction of an information sharing platform in this market between 2001 and 2014. The
platform provides details of previous and current contracts and not simply current payment
status or debt balances. We exploit the staggered timing of lenders’ joining the platform to
estimate the effects of learning about competitors. We find that, upon joining, lenders ad-
just their terms toward what others are offering. Crucially, we address two key confounders:
unobserved common shocks to fundamentals and endogenous timing of joining the bureau.
Consistent with strategic complementarities, lenders’ appear to match competitors in
order to sustain market shares. The strength of this effect depends on the degree of market
power lenders have over their borrowers. This strategic channel exists beyond more conven-
tional channels, such as the revelation of a borrower’s payment history and creditor runs.
We also find that contracts originated after joining were more likely to end up repeatedly
delinquent during the recent crisis relative to contracts originated before, suggesting that a
desire to match competitors can backfire if lenders give less attention to fundamental sources
of risk.
These results shed light on the interaction between information and market competition in
credit markets, as well as many other settings. Learning about competitors is likely becoming
increasingly easier given the rise of large pooled databases and improvements in data mining
techniques. While we find a greater convergence between rivals in our setting, the effect
could potentially go in the other direction. Indeed, a number of markets are characterized
by a large degree of horizontal differentiation or populations of unsophisticated consumers
facing endogenously complex products. The implications for consumer welfare, production
efficiency, and policy design are important questions for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Sample Description
N. of borrowers 2,076
N. of lenders 44
N. of relationships 8,194
N. of contracts 54,290
N. of collateral types 23
N. of relationships per lender 94.0
N. of relationships per borrower 2.0
N. of collateral types per lender 6.1
N. of collateral types per borrower 1.7
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the borrowers and lenders in our regression sample. The
sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to four quarters after the lender joins
the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after joining the bureau
in the given collateral type.
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Figure 3: Origination of Contracts in PayNet
Note: This figure displays the distribution of contract originations by lenders in our setting according to
origination year. The sample is not limited to our regression sample and includes all contracts in the data.
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Figure 4: Contract Maturity
Note: This figure displays the average maturity of the contracts in our regression sample according to origi-
nation year. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to four quarters after
the lender joins the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after
joining the bureau in the given collateral type.
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Table 3: Timing of Lenders Joining PayNet
All lenders Lenders size quartile
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2002 2 2
2003 1 1
2004 9 1 1 2 5
2005 2 1 1
2006 2 1 1
2007 4 1 3
2008 4 1 3
2009 3 2 1
2010 0
2011 4 3 1
2012 7 1 2 4
2013 6 5 1
Total 44 11 11 11 11
Note: This table displays the year of joining PayNet for lenders in our regression sample according to the
size of the lender. Lender size is measured according to total credit upon joining the bureau. We only study
lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after joining the bureau in the given collateral type.
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Table 4: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity: Main Specification
Log |gap| Log maturity
(1) (2) (3)
Post joining platform -0.069** -0.069** 0.024
[-2.30] [-2.34] [1.16]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes
Contract
characteristics FE No Yes Yes
N 54290 54290 54290
Adj. R-squared 0.521 0.522 0.666
Note: This table displays the regression results from estimating Equation 1. The unit of observation is
contract. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to four quarters after
the lender joins the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after
joining the bureau in the given collateral type. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the log
absolute value of the gap between the contract maturity and the bureau average maturity for that collateral
type in the previous quarter (excluding the lender’s own contracts). In column (3), the dependent variable is
the log of contract maturity. Contract characteristic controls include indicators for contract size categories,
leases, and the borrower’s risk category. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by lender. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Figure 5: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity by Market Concentration: Dynamic Coef-
ficients Plot
(a) High HHI (b) Low HHI
Note: This figure plots the coefficients from estimating a piecewise version of Equation (1) using event
quarter indicators. The dashed lines plot 90% level confidence intervals. The sample is split according to
the median HHI of the collateral type-region-contract size category measured at the contract level. The unit
of observation is contract. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to four
quarters after the lender joins the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one
contract after joining the bureau in the given collateral type. The dependent variable is the log absolute
value of the gap between the contract maturity and the bureau average maturity for that collateral type in the
previous quarter (excluding the lender’s own contracts). Contract characteristic controls include indicators
for contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s risk category.
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Table 7: Accounting for Other Shocks
Panel A: Borrower Shocks
Log |gap|
(1) (2)
High HHI Low HHI
Post joining bureau 0.048 -0.044*
[0.89] [-1.79]
Borrower-Year FE Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes
Contract
characteristics FE Yes Yes
N 17615 18175
Adj. R-squared 0.523 0.561
Panel B: Lender Shocks
Log |gap|
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HHI HHI
High Low High Low
Post*Volume -0.002 -0.011* 0.002 -0.008**
[-0.59] [-1.67] [0.38] [-2.09]
Lender-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower-Year FE No No Yes Yes
Contract
characteristics FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 26142 27163 17607 18163
Adj. R-squared 0.553 0.574 0.525 0.560
Note: Panel A displays the regression results from estimating Equation 2. Panel B displays the regression
results from estimating Equation 3, and volume is defined as the number of contracts in the bureau of the
same collateral type still open as of the previous quarter. The sample is split according to the median HHI
of the collateral type-region-contract size category measured at the contract level. The unit of observation is
contract. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to four quarters after the
lender joins the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after joining
the bureau in the given collateral type. In Panel A and columns (3) and (4) of Panel B, in addition to our
main sample restrictions, these tests are also limited to borrowers with at least two outstanding relationships.
The dependent variable is the log absolute value of the gap between the contract maturity and the bureau
average maturity for that collateral type in the previous quarter (excluding the lender’s own contracts).
Contract characteristic controls include indicators for contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s risk
category. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by lender. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 8: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity: Borrower Heterogeneity
Log |gap|
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No past
delinquency
Worst delinquency
<90 days
Single
relationship
Multiple
relationships
Post joining bureau -0.146* -0.080** -0.275*** -0.053*
[-1.76] [-2.40] [-3.40] [-1.76]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contract
characteristics FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4709 24224 7354 46936
Adj. R-squared 0.660 0.562 0.605 0.508
Note: This table displays the regression results from estimating Equation 1 by borrower type. The sub-
samples in columns (1) and (2) are created according to the worst delinquency the borrower has experienced
in the previous three years. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is split according to the number of the
borrower’s credit relationships at the time of contract origination. The unit of observation is contract. The
sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to four quarters after the lender joins
the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after joining the
bureau in the given collateral type. The dependent variable is the log absolute value of the gap between the
contract maturity and the bureau average maturity for that collateral type in the previous quarter (excluding
the lender’s own contracts). Contract characteristic controls include indicators for contract size categories,
leases, and the borrower’s risk category. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by lender. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 10: Joining PayNet and Delinquencies during 2008-2009 Crisis
Number of quarters delinquent in 2008-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All contracts High HHImarket
Low HHI
market
Housing
crisis states Other states
Post joining 0.299** -0.430 0.501** 0.594*** 0.113
[2.54] [-1.60] [2.73] [3.41] [0.73]
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Collateral type-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contract characteristics FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3236 1676 1485 1324 1912
adj. R-sq 0.211 0.230 0.246 0.247 0.232
Note: This table shows the effect of joining PayNet on delinquencies during the crisis. The sample is
restricted to (1) lenders joining between 2005 and 2007, and (2) contracts originated no later than 2006
and still open in 2008-2009. The unit of observation is contract. HHI is the credit-weighted Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for the market, measured in 2001, before the bureau’s inception. Housing crisis states are
defined as those states with a greater than 30% housing price decline from peak, according to the FHFA
index (14 states). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by lender. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.10.
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Online Appendix
Omitted Proofs
Assume the following information structure:
sφi
smi
 =
 φ
m−i
+
φi
mi

and
 φ
m−i
 ∼ N(0,Σ) and
φi
mi
 ∼ N(0,Σe), with Σ and Σe diagonal for simplicity.
We solve for a linear equilibrium, in which the signal from the bureau average is linear
in φ and m−i: m¯ = a0 + aφφ + amm−i + ¯. It is an elementary exercise in this literature to
show that, both before and after joining, there exists an equilibrium linear in the lender’s
signals. Before joining the bureau, lender i offers maturity:
m∗i,pre = m0 + βφpres
φ
i + αβφpresmi + ηif
After joining the bureau, lender i offers maturity:
m∗i,post = m0 + (ρφ + αρm)(m¯− a0) + βφpostsφi + αβmpostsmi + ηif
The weight on the bureau’s signal ρφ +αρm is broken down in two terms to explicitly reflect
that it is informative about both φ and m−i. The vectors of parameters ρ, a and β are
jointly determined and depend on relative signals’ precision. For brevity, we do not include
all the equations that implicitly determine these variable, as solving for a in terms of ρ and
β is sufficient for our argument. The following proposition formalizes the argument behind
the empirical strategy:
Proposition: The variance of the gap between lender’s maturity choice m∗i and the
bureau average m¯ decreases after joining the bureau if and only if the information in the
bureau is new and relevant (ρφ + αρm 6= 0).
To show this, we first solve for aφ and am in m¯ by aggregating m∗i,post across lenders and
identifying the coefficient on φ and m−i:
aφ = βφpost + (ρφ + αρm)aφ
am = αβmpost + (ρφ + αρm)am
⇐⇒ aφ =
βφpost
1−(ρφ+αρm)
am =
αβmpost
1−(ρφ+αρm)
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hence m¯ = m0 +
βφpost
1−(ρφ+αρm)φ+
αβmpost
1−(ρφ+αρm)m−i + ¯. Substituting in m
∗
i,post:
m∗i,post = m0 +
βφpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)φ+
αβmpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)m−i+β
φ
post
φ
i +αβmpostmi +(ρφ+αρm)¯+ηif
The tracking error between m∗i,post and m¯ after joining the bureau is thus:
dpost = βφpostφi + αβmpostmi − (1− ρφ − αρm)¯+ ηif
On the other hand, before joining the bureau the tracking error between m∗i,pre and m¯ is:
dpre = βφpre
φ
i +αβmpremi −¯+
(
βφpre −
βφpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)
)
φ+
(
αβmpre −
αβmpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)
)
m−i+ηif
From the last two expressions, it is clear that, as long as the bureau information is infor-
mative, the variance of tracking error d is smaller after joining the bureau. Assuming the
correlation between i and ¯ is negligible:
V [dpost] = βφpost2V [φi ] + α2βmpost2V [mi ] + (1− ρφ − αρm)2V [¯] + V ar[η]
V [dpre] = βφpre2V [
φ
i ] + α2βmpre2V [mi ] + V [¯] + V [η]
+
(
βφpre −
βφpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)
)2
V [φ] +
(
αβmpre −
αβmpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)
)2
V [m−i]
Inspecting term by term reveals that the variance drops after joining the bureau (note that
βpost ≤ βpre). Only in the limit case in which the bureau information is not informative is
V [dpost] = V [dpre], as ρφ + αρm = 0 and βpost = βpre.
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Additional Results
Table A.1: Distribution of collateral types
Collateral type Freq. Percent
Agricultural 3,410 6.28
Airplane 22 0.04
Automobile 595 1.10
Boat 3 0.01
Bus 128 0.24
Construction and Mining 6,049 11.14
Computer 4,538 8.36
Copier 18,737 34.51
Energy 6 0.01
Forklift 1,520 2.80
Logging 90 0.17
Medium Truck 2,547 4.69
Medical 601 1.11
Manufacturing 1,134 2.09
Office 1,217 2.24
Printing 196 0.36
Railroad 33 0.06
Real Estate 152 0.28
Retail 2,437 4.49
Telephone 2,194 4.04
Truck 8,333 15.35
Vending 237 0.44
Waste 111 0.20
Total 54,290 100.00
Note: This table presents the distribution of collateral types for the contracts in our regression sample. The
unit of observation is contract. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to
four quarters after the lender joins the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and
one contract after joining the bureau in the given collateral type.
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Table A.2: Unexplained Variation in Maturity Choice
Regressors included Root MSE of maturity residual R-squared
collateral type FE 17.27 0.04
collateral type + Year FE 17.25 0.05
collateral type + Year + Lender FE 16.17 0.17
collateral type + Year + Lender
+Borrower FE 13.40 0.52
collateral type + Year
+ Lender-Borrower FE 10.32 0.76
collateral type + Year
+ Lender-Borrower
+ Contract characteristics FE
10.18 0.76
Note: This table displays the root mean squared error of a regression of contract maturity (in months) on
a combination of fixed effects. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to
the four quarters after the lender joins the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before
and one contract after joining the bureau in the given collateral type.
46
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286425 
Table A.3: Pre-Trends
One quarter before joining One year before joining
Loan size
25th percentile 6,289 5,959
Median 20,241 20,000
75th percentile 67,621 68,852
Maturity
25th percentile 36 36
Median 37 37
75th percentile 60 60
Log square gap
25th percentile 2.19 2.22
Median 2.50 2.45
75th percentile 2.77 2.75
Note: This table displays contract terms prior to joining the bureau according to when they were originated.
We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after joining the bureau in the given
collateral type.
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Figure A.1: Annual Growth in Contracts in Platform by Collateral Type
Note: This figure displays the annual growth rate of the number of contracts in the bureau for the five main
collateral types: agricultural equipment, construction and mining equipment, computers, copiers, and trucks.
The sample is not limited to our regression sample and includes all contracts in the data.
Table A.5: Market Power Proxies: Summary Statistics
Market Power Proxy N. Mean S.D. p25 Median p75
HHI for collateral type-contract size-region 53305 0.34 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.42
HHI for collateral type-contract size 54101 0.24 0.11 0.15 0.27 0.27
Relationship switching rate 53857 0.007 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.009
Note: This table summarizes competitive features for observations in our regression sample. The unit of
observation is contract. HHI is the credit-weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the market, measured
in 2001, before the bureau’s inception. Markets are defined as a collateral type-census region-contract size
category or collateral type-contract size category combination. Ther relationship switching rate is defined as
the fraction of relationships that are ended to start a relationship with a new lender.
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